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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARY ELIZABETH COLBURN, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
JAMES ROBERT COLBURN, 
Defendant/Appellant. ; 
i Docket No. 950225 CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 
78-2a-3(2)(i) of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court properly find that Defendant was 
voluntarily underemployed, and did the court properly impute income 
of $40,000.00 per year to Defendant, for purposes of awarding 
alimony, where Defendant chose to start his own business as a 
certified financial planner, even though he knew that it would take 
him a minimum of five years to establish a profitable practice, 
rather than utilize his readily transferrable and marketable skills 
to seek full time employment, which could earn him up to 
$100,000.00 per year? Reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard to determine if the court improperly found that Defendant 
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was voluntarily underemployed- Hill v. Hill. 869 P.2d 1209 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding 
alimony of $1,000.00 per month for five (5) years and $500.00 per 
month thereafter, where the parties enjoyed a very high standard of 
living during their marriage, and where Mrs. Colburn demonstrated 
both that she lacks sufficient funds to meet her ordinary monthly 
expenses and that Defendant had the capacity to pay his expenses 
and to provide spousal support for Mrs. Colburn? Reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, (Utah App. 
1991) cert, denied, 817 P.2d 325 (Utah 1991), Crockett v. Crockett. 
836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1991). 
3. Did the trial court properly divide Defendant's naval 
pension when it utilized the formula set forth in Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 432, (Utah 1982), rather than the point system 
allegedly used by the United States Armed Services, where there was 
no testimony regarding the mechanics of the point system? Reviewed 
under the correction of error standard to determine if the court 
committed clear error in dividing the pension. Bingham v. Binghamr 
872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A^ . NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT: 
This is an appeal from a Judgment awarding Mrs, Colburn 
alimony and a portion of Defendant's Navy pension. The judgment 
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was entered on September 12, 1994, by the Honorable Glenn Iwasaki, 
Third District Court Judge, in connection with an action for decree 
of divorce filed on May 12, 1994. 
On September 14, 1994, Judge Iwasaki awarded Mrs. Colburn 
permanent alimony in the amount of $1,000.00 per month for five (5) 
years, and in the amount of $500.00 per month thereafter. (Tr. 10 
[Bench Ruling - Appellant's Addendum 1]). The court also awarded 
Mrs. Colburn thirty-four percent (34%) of Defendant's naval 
retirement plan in accordance with the formula set forth in 
Woodward v. Woodward, supra. 
Various post-trial motions concerning the language of the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by both parties, 
and were resolved at a hearing held on March 3, 1995; the findings, 
conclusions and decree were entered on that date. Defendant also 
filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment in re: alimony, which 
motion was denied, without hearing, on December 29, 1994. 
JL. STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE; 
1. Mrs. Colburn and Defendant were married on September l, 
1973, in San Francisco, California. (R. 212, Para. 2 FOF). 
2. The parties have two children born as issue of this 
marriage: Michelle Rene Colburn, born March 19, 1977, and James 
Andrew Colburn, born April 12, 1983. (R. 212, Para. 4 FOF). 
3. During the course of the parties1 marriage Mrs. Colburn 
did not work for extended periods of time. (Tr. 36). 
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4. During the course of the parties1 marriage, Defendant 
worked for National Aviation Underwriters from 1971 through 
February, 1988 and Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters from 
May, 1988 until July 1, 1992. (Tr. 77, 83, 85, 90). 
5. While working for National Aviation Underwriters Defendant 
advanced through the ranks to became Regional Vice-President and 
eventually President and Chief Operating Officer for the company. 
(Tr. 36, 37, 76, 77, 78). 
6. After leaving National Aviation Underwriters Defendant was 
hired by Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters as one of its 
Vice-Presidents. (Tr. 85). 
7. During his time with National Aviation Underwriters 
Defendant oversaw a variety of insurance related projects and also 
acted in a managerial capacity over other employees. (Tr. 36, 77, 
78) . 
8. The parties enjoyed a high standard of living during their 
marriage, which included twice yearly vacations, and a financial 
situation which permitted them to make regular contributions to 
their savings and stock plans, beginning in 1982. (Tr. 41, 42). 
9. During the course of their marriage the parties 
accumulated approximately $450,000.00 in non-IRA assets, and 
$608,000.00 in IRA accounts, which were divided equally between the 
parties. (R. 214, 219; Para. 15, 35 FOF). 
10. On July 1, 1992, the day he was ordered to pay $5,000.00 
in family support by a Louisiana Court, Defendant submitted his 
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resignation from Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters, at the 
request of the company. (Tr. 32, 33, 34). 
11. In 1989 Defendant earned $117,980 from employment; in 
1990 Defendant earned $129,802.00; in 1991 Defendant earned 
$140,585.00; and, in 1992 Defendant earned $126,286.00. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 27; R. 212, Para. 7 FOF). 
12. After resigning from Southern Marine and Aviation 
Underwriters, Defendant contacted three (3) or four (4) 
individuals, and attended one (1) interviews seeking employment. 
(Tr. 39, 94). 
13. Defendant declined to seek employment in other areas of 
the insurance business, and turned down two (2) job offers. (Tr. 
98) . 
14. Defendant declined to seek employment outside of his 
specific areas of expertise in the aviation insurance industry, 
desiring instead to start his own business as a financial planner 
in Park City. (Tr. 98, 99, 100, 101). 
15. In June of 1993, the parties relocated to Park City, 
Utah, and Defendant started Summit Financial Advisors Group, Inc., 
in August of 1993. (Tr. 101, 102). 
16. At the time Defendant chose to become a certified 
financial planner he realized that it would take four to five years 
to establish a profitable business. (Tr. 105; R. 213; Para. 11 
FOF) . 
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17. Defendant refused to seek additional or outside 
employment to support his family, in spite of repeated requests 
from Mrs, Colburn to do so. (Tr. 34). 
18. Defendant was requested by the President of VEMCO to head 
up its commercial department. (Tr. 180). 
19. Defendant testified that he did not look for employment 
in other areas of the insurance industry because he was tired of 
getting bumped out of the corporate jobs. (Tr. 180). 
20. Defendant's refusal to seek employment was a 
precipitating factor in inducing the divorce, and caused Mrs. 
Colburn to seek employment outside the home for the first time in 
seven (7) years. (Tr. 34, 36). 
21. At the time of trial, Defendant was fifty-one (51) years 
of age. He is in good health, has a college education, and a 
certificate as a Certified Financial Planner, and has job skills 
acquired during his employment as an officer in the Naval Armed 
Services and as a high level executive with National Aviation 
Underwriters and Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters that can 
be transferred to different or other fields of employment, 
including marketing and public relations manager and management 
consultant. (Tr. 75, 142; R. 213, Para. 10 FOF). 
22. In the Salt Lake labor market there are close to 100 
firms that are engaged in financial planning services. (Tr. 128). 
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23. The salary for those employed in the area of financial 
planning services ranges from $28,000.00 to $71,000.00 annually. 
(Tr. 128). 
24. Normally, Utah salaries are ninety-five percent (95%) of 
the national average. (Tr. 128). 
25. Defendant could expand his practice by expanding his 
business into commission sales planning. (Tr. 150). 
26. Employees hired by financial planning services are also 
given the opportunity to earn their security licenses while they 
work for those firms. (Tr. 128, 129). 
27. Defendant did not desire employment with an established 
financial planning firm because he believed that he can make more 
money as an independent Certified Financial Planner. (Tr. 186). 
28. Management consultants can commonly earn between 
$75,000.00 and $100,000.00 per annum. The middle range of salaries 
for those in this position is between $24,900.00 and $51,000.00 per 
annum. Salaries in Utah would be approximately ninety-five percent 
(95%) of this range. (Tr. 143). 
29. Salaries for public relations managers range between 
$36,000.00 to $52,000.00 per annum. (Tr. 142). 
30. Defendant is a licensed pilot, with a commercial 
classification, trained by the United States military. (Tr. 162). 
31. Co-pilots earn an annual salary in the range of 
$28,000.00 to $36,000.00. (Tr. 129). 
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32. Defendant estimates that he can eventually earn between 
$30,000.00 and $40,00.00 per year as a certified financial planner. 
(Tr. 189). 
33. In addition to the non-IRA and IRA funds divided equally 
by the parties, Defendant is the owner of an ULTRA investment 
account, which was valued, at the time of trial, at $61,220.67. The 
court imputed income to Defendant at a rate of six percent (6%) per 
annum on that account, for a monthly total of $306.10. (R. 214, 
Para. 17 FOF) . 
34. The court also imputed income to both parties in the 
amount of $1,125.00 per month, as interest, on their non-IRA funds. 
(R. 214, Para. 16 FOF). 
35. The trial court found that Defendant was voluntarily 
underemployed, and determined that he could earn an annual salary 
of $40,000.00, or $3,333.33 per month, should he choose to remedy 
his voluntary underemployment. This figure was based on his work 
history, his occupational qualifications, the transferability of 
his skills, the prevailing earnings of people with similar 
backgrounds in the community and the testimony of experts. (R. 213, 
Para. 12 FOF). I 
36. Defendant's gross monthly income from all sources, 
including income imputed due to his voluntary underemployment, is 
$5,028.43. (R. 213, 214; Para. 12, 16, 17 FOF). 
37. Defendant's monthly expenses at the time of trial, 
including child support, were $2,179.00. Defendant's child support 
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obligation was reduced by $260.00 in June of 1995, when his oldest 
child reached 18 years of age. (Defendant's Exhibit 28, as 
corrected in Appellant's Brief, Point II). 
38. Defendant has a positive cash flow of $2,849.43 per 
month. ($5,028.43 [income] - $2,179.00 [expenses] = $2,849.43). 
(R. 213, 214; Para. 12, 16, 17 FOF; Defendant's Exhibit 28, as 
corrected in Appellant's Brief, Point II). 
39. Mrs. Colburn is a registered nurse, earning a gross 
monthly salary of $2,900.00 per month. (Tr. 35; Para. 13 FOF). 
40. At the time of divorce, Mrs. Colburn's total gross 
monthly income, including interest imputed on the non-IRA funds and 
child support, was $4,729.00 ($2,900.00 employment, $1,125.00 non-
IRA earnings, $704.00 child support). (R. 213, 214, 215; Para. 18 
FOF) . 
41. Mrs. Colburn's monthly expenses at the time of divorce 
totaled $3,906.30, which did not include allowances for regular 
vacations generally taken by the family or contributions to her 
savings plan. (Tr. 42, Plaintiff's Exhibit 7). 
42. Based on gross wages, not taking into account tax 
considerations, Mrs. Colburn has a monthly positive cash flow of 
$822.70. (R. 213, 214, 215; Para. 18 FOF; Plaintiff's Exhibit 7). 
43. During the year prior to the parties' divorce the marital 
residence was sold. (Tr. 168). 
44. The court found that Mrs. Colburn would need to purchase 
a new home. (Tr. 9 [Bench Ruling - Appellant's Addendum 1]). 
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to $100,000.00 a year, if he chose to seek employment rather than 
start his own financial planning business. 
III. The trial court was well within its discretion when it 
awarded Mrs. Colburn $1,000.00 per month in alimony for the first 
five (5) years after the divorce, and $500.00 per month thereafter. 
The court provided the necessary analysis for each of the factors 
required to award alimony, and also considered that Mrs. Colburn 
had been accustomed to a relatively high standard of living during 
the course of the parties' marriage. Mrs. Colburn demonstrated a 
need for alimony, and Mr. Colburn has both the earning capacity and 
the accumulated capital necessary to provide such support* 
IV, The trial court properly awarded Mrs. Colburn thirty-four 
percent (34%) of Defendant's military pension, based upon the 
formula set forth in Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P. 2d 431 (Utah 
1982). Woodward is the leading case regarding the distribution of 
retirement benefits, and there was no testimony introduced at trial 
as to how the navy "point system" worked. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SATISFACTORILY MARSHALL 
THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE COURT COMMITTED 
CLEAR ERROR WHEN IT FOUND THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
VOLUNTARILY UNDEREMPLOYED. THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING SHOULD BE LEFT UNDISTURBED. 
In contesting the conclusion that he is voluntarily 
underemployed, Defendant has posed a challenge to a finding of fact 
made by the trial court after hearing, considering and weighing the 
11 
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1986 to 1988 and vice president of Southern Marine and Aviation 
Underwriters from 1988 until 1992. (Tr. 78, 126). Defendant also 
failed to note that Connie Romboy, rehabilitation\employment 
specialist at the Career Guidance Center, testified that it is 
essential to look at the transferability and marketability of the 
skills obtained as a result of Defendant's employment as a high-
level executive to accurately determine what he might make in the 
current labor market. (Tr. 137). Without reference to that 
testimony, Ms. Romboy1s conclusion that Defendant might make 
between $36,000.00 and $52,000.00 per year as a public relations 
manager and up to $100,00.00 per year as a management consultant is 
taken out of its proper context and thereby rendered less 
meaningful. (Tr. 142, 143). Defendant also declined to note that 
he sent no resumes or applications for employment to companies 
operating outside of a contracting aviation insurance industry; 
that after losing his job with Southern Marine and Aviation, the 
president of VEMCO asked him to head up its commercial department; 
and, that he declined to seek employment outside of aviation 
insurance because he was "tired of getting bumped out of corporate 
jobs". (Tr. 180). 
Defendant's failure to adequately marshall the evidence is 
also apparent when the court considers that paucity of references 
to the evidence of career possibilities that exist for him outside 
of operating his own business. For example, Defendant makes no 
mention of the fact that he was trained as a pilot by the United 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL DEMONSTRATED 
THAT DEFENDANT IS A HIGHLY TRAINED CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 
WITH JOB SKILLS THAT COULD BE READILY TRANSFERRED TO 
OTHER SECTORS OF PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT. IN IMPUTING 
INCOME OF $40,000.00 PER ANNUM TO DEFENDANT THE 
COURT ACTED CONSERVATIVELY BY CHOOSING A FIGURE 
AT THE LOW END OF SPECTRUM OF THE SALARIES PAID FOR 
THE TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT AVAILABLE FOR SOMEONE WITH 
DEFENDANT'S SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE. 
Utah law requires that prior to imputing income to a party in 
a divorce action the court must first find that the party is 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Utah Code Ann., Section 
78-45-7.5(7)(a), which has been applied in both child support and 
alimony cases, codifies this requirement and provides: 
Income may not be imputed to a parent unless 
the parent stipulates to the amount imputed or 
a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or under-
employed. 
The question of what constitutes voluntary underemployment has 
been the subject of considerable activity in the appellate courts 
in recent years. In Hall v. Hall, supra, at 1026, the Utah Court 
of Appeals explained that a finding of voluntarily underemployment 
must be based on a thorough appraisal of a variety of factors, 
including the party's abilities, his employment capacity, his 
earnings potential, and the possible job openings available to the 
party. In this case, the trial court considered and weighed each 
of these factors, and concluded that Defendant had significant 
marketable skills, acquired over a lifetime of employment as a high 
level executive, which would allow him to obtain meaningful 
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opportunities available in that arena, such a narrow focus could 
mislead the Court into thinking that he has no opportunities for 
meaningful employment outside of the general aviation industry. 
Upon direct examination, Ms. Connie Roraboy, a vocational expert, 
who specializes in displaced workers testified as follows: 
Either of these positions [vice-president and 
president] would plan and develop policies and 
objectives, coordinate functions of operations 
between divisions and departments to establish 
responsibilities and procedures. They would 
set financial goals. They would plan with the 
current conditions of the labor market, and 
they would direct coordinate the formulation 
of financial programs to maximize profits and 
increase productivity ... and then based on 
the specific industry or product, then they 
would be — then that would be specific to 
their particular duties. 
But the things that I have read off in terms 
of this definition is really the definition of 
transferability of skills. There's the 
assumption that if one can plan and develop 
policies to operate, for instance, a career 
guidance center, that same individual could go 
to the University of Utah and plan and develop 
policies for perhaps the Department of Social 
Work, or perhaps transfer into a hospital 
setting where still — so the whole basis is 
that the functional things are much more 
important than the specific work content 
skills which are often the things that are the 
easiest. In other words, its easier to learn 
about a product than it is ... how to direct 
and plan and manage people. That is the 
foundation that most vocational evaluators 
will go in terms of doing a workup on 
potential employment. (Tr. 140, 141) 
(emphasis added). 
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was "tired of getting bumped out of corporate jobs".1 (Tr. 180). 
He also testified that he had limited himself to fee-only financial 
planning, rather than the broader and more profitable field of 
commission sales planning. (Tr. 150, 180). This self-imposed 
limitation means that he did not seek employment from any of the 
more than one hundred (100) companies selling financial planning 
services that are located on the Wasatch front. (Tr. 128). Ms. 
Romboy testified that nationally such financial consultants can 
expect to earn between $28,000.00 and $71,000.00 per year, with 
Utah wages being ninety-five percent (95%) of the national average. 
(Tr. 128). 
Defendant's testimony, in conjunction with Ms. Romboyfs 
testimony about transferable skills, was the foundation upon which 
the court determined that Defendant was voluntarily underemployed. 
In his bench ruling Judge Iwasaki stated: 
There were many times in his testimony when 
asked, upon cross examination or even direct 
examination, if he would choose to go into one 
area or another. There were answers to the 
effect that: I choose to be a certified 
financial planner. [•••] This is what I want 
to develop. 
He did that knowing that the start up time at 
a minimum of four to five years will have to 
occur before anything of fruition will come of 
his efforts ... 
1
 This testimony was elicited in connection with an inquiry 
about possible employment outside of the general aviation 
underwriting business, and testimony that after resigning from 
Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriting he was asked by the 
Chairman of VEMCO to head up its commercial department.(Tr. 180). 
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Even being^conservative in looking at Ms. 
Romboy's testimony, it appears to the court 
that if Mr. Colburn, with his vast experience, 
his education and his practical aspects that I 
find of him to be attractive in that nature, 
if he were just to apply himself in any other 
area instead of persisting in the certified 
financial planning area he could be 
selling insurance ... he could be working with 
IDS, which was a product sales as well as 
service; he could be doing sto;k brokerage, if 
he completes his licensing, i^.r. > to eight 
months he indicated that would 
would be no doubt in the court's 
would be successful ,, . ii_. 
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three recent cases: Hall v. Hall. 858 P. 2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993); 
Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991); and Willev v. Willev. 
866 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1993). 
In Hall v. Hall, supra, the husband had been employed as a 
computer consultant and software developer and had earnings in 
excess of $100,000.00 per year in the three (3) years immediately 
preceding trial. Approximately ten (10) days before trial the 
husband lost his job and obtained another, which paid only 
$40,000.00 per year. The trial court found, on the basis of his 
prior earnings history, that the husband was voluntarily 
underemployed and that income should be imputed at a level equal to 
his prior wages. The court of appeals overturned that decision, 
and remanded the case for more detailed finding, stating that past 
salary was only one factor that must be considered in making a 
determination of underemployment. 
In Bell v. Bell, supra, the trial court ignored undisputed 
testimony that Mrs. Bell actually earned $863.00 per month as a 
part time teaching assistant at Utah State University, and imputed 
income to her at a level equal to that which she had previously 
enjoyed as a full-time school teacher in another state. Similarly, 
in Willey v. Willev. supra, the trial court first imputed income to 
the wife based upon full-time employment at her current wage, and 
then raised that figure by speculating, without foundation, that 
Mrs. Willey would be able to raise her income to $1,500.00 to 
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financial planner earning $260.00 per month, Defendant continually 
asserted he chose to do so because that is where his education and 
interests lie. (Tr. 180) . This choice was made at the expense of 
the opportunity to make a higher salary in a job less related to 
his expressed desire to become a fee-only financial planner. 
While, Mr. Colburn is free to make such a personal decision, in 
light of the ruling in Hill, his personal preferences should not 
undermine his obligations to support Mrs. Colburn. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN AWARDING $1,000.00 PER MONTH IN ALIMONY 
TO MRS. COLBURN. MRS. COLBURN DEMONSTRATED BOTH 
THAT SHE NEEDED THE SUPPORT AND THAT DEFENDANT 
HAD THE CAPACITY TO PAY. 
It is a well established principle of Utah law that a trial 
court is granted broad discretion in fashioning an award of 
alimony. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 819 (Utah App. 1992). 
It is equally clear that the appellate courts must presume that the 
trial court has made the proper decision in this area, and uphold 
its ruling, unless the record indicates that there has been a clear 
and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Id. . at 819-820 (quoting 
Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982)). See also Bingham v. 
Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211, cert, denied, 817 P.2d 325 (Utah 
1991)). An abuse of discretion is committed when a trial court 
has made its decision without reference to established standards. 
Willev, supra at 550. 
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In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth the standard test for awarding alimony in 
Utah, The court stated: 
Three factors ... must be considered in fixing a 
reasonable alimony award: 
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the 
[spouse seeking support] 
[2] the ability of the [spouse seeking support] 
to produce a sufficient income for herself; and 
[3] the ability of the [payor spouse] to provide 
support. 
This standard has appeared repeatedly in cases addressing the 
issue of the propriety of awarding alimony. Thronson v. Thronson, 
810 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah App. 1991), Hill v. Hill, supra, and 
Schaumbera v. Schaumbera. supra• 
In the case at bar, there can be no doubt that the trial court 
utilized these criteria in determining that Defendant should pay 
Mrs. Colburn alimony. It is equally clear that, under the facts of 
this case, the trial court acted well within its discretion in 
fixing the award at $1,000.00 per month for the first five (5) 
years, and $500.00 per month thereafter. 
In considering the needs of Mrs. Colburn the court first 
looked to her fixed monthly expenses and determined that the total 
of $3,906.30 was a reasonable amount for a person of her station in 
life. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 7). This sum did not include amounts 
normally used for regular savings and family vacations, which had 
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been substantial in the past.3 In addition, the court noted that 
the parties had previously sold their marital residence, and that 
Mrs. Colburn would have a specific need for a new home. (Tr. 9 
[Bench Ruling - Appellant's Addendum 1]). 
The court then looked to Mrs. Colburn's ability to pay those 
expenses. It was uncontroverted that Mrs. Colburn, who returned to 
the work force as a registered nurse after many years of not 
working, earns $2,900.00 a month. (Tr. 35, 36; R. 213; Para. 13 
FOF) . The court also imputed income of $1,125.00 per month as a 
reasonable rate of return on her non-IRA investments. (R. 214; 
Para. 16 FOF). Together with child support in the amount of 
$704.00 awarded at trial4, Mrs. Colburn has gross monthly resources 
of $4,729.00 to meet her expenses. Defendant has claimed that this 
leaves Mrs. Colburn with a positive cash flow of $823.00 per month, 
exclusive of alimony. Of course this statement completely ignores 
all tax consequences. In fact, Mrs. Colburn pays $800.00 in 
regular taxes and deductions from her paycheck; these taxes, in 
themselves, completely consume the alleged positive cash flow. 
In contrast Defendant has the ability to generate $5,028.4 3 in 
gross monthly income, including income imputed to him by the trial 
3
 It is entirely proper that the court consider these 
additional expenditures. In Schaumberg, supra, at 602, the Court 
of Appeals stated that when the payor spouse's resources are 
adequate, an alimony award should also consider the recipient's 
station in life. 
4
 This sum has subsequently been reduced when the parties' 
oldest child reached 18 years of age in June of 1995. 
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court. (R. 213, 214; Para. 12, 16, 17 FOF). His fixed monthly 
expenses total $2,179.00, including child support, leaving him with 
a positive cash flow of $2,849.43 per month. (Defendant's Exhibit 
28, as corrected in Appellant's Brief, Point II). Thus, Defendant 
is able to pay his monthly expenses, provide Mrs. Colburn the 
support ordered by the court, and still have a positive cash flow 
of $1,849.43. This, in fact, is slightly greater than the positive 
cash flow that is enjoyed by Mrs. Colburn when alimony is added to 
her gross monthly income ($823.00 + $1,000.00 = $1,823.00). 
Since all three elements set forth in Jones, supra, were 
weighed by the court and adequate findings were entered, it is 
difficult to imagine that the court has abused its discretion in 
making such an award. 
Defendant's sole argument for abuse of discretion lies in his 
convoluted reasoning that the court should have considered only his 
actual income in fashioning his alimony obligation. Thus he claims 
that the payment of alimony lowers his standard of living below 
that enjoyed by Mrs. Colburn, which would be impermissible under 
the holding in Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 
1988). Defendant's argument ignores the obvious point; it is not 
the payment of alimony that is creating his alleged financial 
distress, it is his voluntary choice not to seek the salaried 
employment for which he is eminently qualified. 
Defendant also briefly argues that the alimony award was, in 
part, based on the trial court's recognition that Mrs. Colburn is 
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currently pursuing a graduate degree in nursing so as to obtain a 
better paying position in the future. (Tr. 42) . This is simply 
not the case. In fact, the court determined that after Mrs. 
Colburn obtained her degree she would be capable of a greater level 
of self support. This in turn was used to justify a decrease in 
the award to $500.00 per month after the five (5) years she 
estimated it would take to finish her education. Under the second 
prong of the Jones test, such reasoning is both appropriate and 
necessary in fixing an alimony obligation. 
Simply stated the court committed no abuse of discretion in 
awarding Mrs. Colburn alimony in the amount of $1,000.00 per month. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN APPLYING THE WOODWARD 
FORMULA IN DIVIDING DEFENDANT'S NAVAL RETIREMENT. 
NO TESTIMONY WAS INTRODUCED TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CONTENTION THAT THE VALUE OF HIS PENSION IS 
DETERMINED BY A POINT SYSTEM. 
Under well established Utah law, pension rights are subject to 
equitable division by the court under the formula set forth in 
Woodward v. Woodwardr 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). In that case, the 
court stated that the proper method of distribution is to divide 
the number of years the parties1 have been married by the number of 
years the spouse has worked at the relevant place of employment; 
with the non-pensioned spouse entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of 
that amount. This is precisely what the court did in this case. 
Defendant has sought to have this decision overturned, by 
claiming that the true value of his pension is measured by a point 
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system rather than by the total number of years he served in the 
service. Unfortunately, there was no testimony introduced at trial 
to substantiate that claim. Defendant, himself, attempted to 
explain the system to the court, however, his testimony was 
excluded, upon objection of Plaintifffs counsel, as lacking proper 
foundation to testify in that regard. (Tr. 114). 
Without competent testimony, the court was without a reliable 
means of determining how to translate the accrued points into a set 
monetary value. Accordingly, it relied upon the formula set forth 
in Woodward, supra, to determine the proper equitable division of 
the asset. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's challenge to the court's imputation of income 
fails on two points. First, he has failed to marshall the evidence 
in a manner sufficient for the Court of Appeals to determine that 
the trial court committed clear error in finding that he was 
voluntarily underemployed. Second, the evidence and testimony 
introduced at trial clearly supports the court's finding. 
Defendant is a highly trained executive, with skills that could be 
easily transferred to other areas of employment, if he so desired. 
Defendant's challenge to the amount of the alimony award must 
also be denied. The court fixed his obligation in accordance with 
well established legal standards, and any financial hardship 
suffered by Defendant is the result of his refusal to seek 
employment, rather than as a result of the award itself. 
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Finally, the court should decline to overrule the trial 
court's distribution of Defendant's naval pension. The .court 
accomplished that division by clear reference to the appropriate 
legal standards set forth in Woodward, supra, and Defendant failed 
to introduce any testimony in support of his alternate "point 
system" theory of distribution. 
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